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INSIDER TRADING AND INVESTMENT
ANALYSTS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
DIRKS V SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE

COMMISSION
Daniel R. Fischel*
INTRODUCTION

Raymond Dirks is an investments analyst who persuaded his clients to sell their shares in Equity Funding of America after he received information from officials of the firm that the shares were
overvalued because of a massive fraud. For his efforts, he was censured by the Securities and Exchange Commission for violating the
general antifraud provision of the securities laws, Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 and Rule lOb-5 2 promulgated
thereunder. The censure was upheld by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia.3 In Dirks v. SEC,4 however, the Supreme
Court reversed Dirks' censure. Dirks, the Court stated, was a stranger to Equity Funding, with no pre-existing fiduciary duty to its
shareholders. 5 Nor could Dirks be considered a "tippee" who had a
duty to disclose the information publicly, because the insiders who
provided the information about the fraud received no money or personal benefit and did not intend to make a gift of valuable information to Dirks.' Instead, their motivation was "a desire to expose the
fraud."17 Thus, the Court concluded, Dirks was not "'a participant
after the fact in [an] insider's breach of fiduciary duty' "8 and had
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. The author thanks Peter Aranson, Walter Blum and Geoffrey Miller for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1976).
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984).
3. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
4. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).

5. Id. at 665.
6. Id. at 667.
7. Id. at 667.
8.

Id. (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980)).
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no duty to abstain from the use of the insider information he had
obtained.
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
dissented. In their view, the insiders breached their fiduciary duties
to Equity Funding's shareholders, regardless of their motives for doing so. That the insiders derived no benefit from the breach in no
way "eradicate[s] the shareholder's injury." 9 Moreover, the dissent
emphasized, it was undisputed that, as fiduciaries, the insiders could
not trade on the basis of the information communicated to Dirks. It
was equally clear that, as fiduciaries, they should not be able to do
indirectly what they were prohibited from doing personally. 10 The
effect of Dirks' selective dissemination of information received from
insiders, the dissent stated, was "that Dirks' clients were able to shift
the losses that were inevitable due to the Equity Funding fraud from
themselves to uninformed market participants."" Instead of revealing the information to his clients, Dirks, as a citizen, should have
reported the information to the Securities and Exchange Commission and other authorities.12 Because he did not do so, the dissent
concluded that Dirks aided and abetted the breach of fiduciary duty
by the insiders of Equity Funding.
At first glance the majority and dissenting opinions appear to
endorse radically different conceptions of the permissible activities of
insiders and analysts who possess valuable information. The majority
opinion emphatically rejects the notion, endorsed by the dissent, that
obtaining a private benefit from possession of valuable information is
unlawful or objectionable. As the majority correctly noted, denying
those with valuable information the ability to profit on it would
"have an inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts which
the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a
healthy market."' 3 More generally, market participants must have
an incentive to gather and analyze information for capital markets to
exist. The majority, unlike the dissent, recognized this central
principle.
Despite this fundamental difference, the majority and dissenting
opinions have much in common. Both agree, for example, that trading by insiders on the basis of insider information is a breach of
9. Id. at 673 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
10. Id. at 671 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 670 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
12.

Id. at 677 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

13. Id. at 658 (footnote omitted).
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fiduciary duty. And each opinion assumes that both analysts and insiders act illegally in most cases if valuable information is communicated to analysts, who in turn disseminate it to their clients. The
insider breaches his fiduciary duty by communicating the information to analysts; the analyst who does not abstain from using the
information is a participant after the fact in the insider's breach.
One other feature common to both opinions is a disregard for
principles of economics. Although the majority opinion refers to the
salutary role of investment analysts in the operation of capital markets, much of its analysis reflects a lack of understanding of the implications of this principle. Nor does either opinion discuss other relevant concepts, such as agency costs and the role of insider trading
as a compensation device. Indeed, the only explicit reference to principles of economics was in Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion,
and then only to point out that they are irrelevant, "extreme" and
inconsistent with "the existence of any enforceable principle of fair14
ness between market participants.
Notwithstanding this disregard for principles of economics,
questions such as the effect of insider trading on a firm's investors
and the role of analysts in communicating information to market
participants are economic, not legal questions. It is impossible to formulate rational legal rules governing those situations without some
understanding of the economic consequences of different kinds of actions. Without such an understanding, legal analysis is reduced to a
vacuous recitation of cliches and talismanic phrases devoid of analytical content. If insider trading is beneficial to investors because it
increases their wealth, for example, it would be irrational to interpret the fiduciary duty owed to investors, the supposed beneficiaries
of fiduciary duties, as prohibiting the practice.
This essay provides what the opinions in Dirks lack: an analysis
of the issues presented in light of relevant principles of economics.
Part I discusses the relationship between the fiduciary duty of corporate managers and insider trading. Because there is no evidence that
trading by insiders systematically harms shareholders, I conclude
that we should not equate the existence of fiduciary duties with a
prohibition against insider trading. Part I goes on to analyze whether
insiders of Equity Funding breached their fiduciary duty to the
firm's current investors by revealing information that resulted in a
14. Id. at 677 n.14 (citing H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 5976, 111-46 (1966); Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547,
565-76 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Manne, Law Professors]).
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reduction of the value of the firm.
Part II focuses on the role of investment analysts. These market
professionals create social benefits by reducing problems of asymmetric information faced by competing sellers of securities and by
monitoring the actions of corporate managers. They may also provide private benefits to investors who rely on their recommendations
in an attempt to earn abnormal positive returns. Because of these
social and private benefits, I argue, legal rules should act to increase,
not decrease, the private returns of information acquisition, and analysts should be free of legal rules restricting the use of inside
information.
I.

INSIDER TRADING AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES

In Dirks the Court reaffirmed the rule established in the earlier
decision of Chiarellav. United States15 that the obligation to abstain
from using valuable information, absent public disclosure, rests on
the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the party using the
information and the firm's shareholders. Parties such as Dirks who
receive information from insiders -

"tippees" -

also have a duty to

abstain if the insider's "tip" constituted a breach of fiduciary duty.
What the Court failed to discuss, however, was why insider trading
is inconsistent with the fiduciary duty of corporate managers. Analysis of this question requires an understanding of the meaning of fiduciary duties as well as the effect of trading on inside information.
A.

The Meaning of Fiduciary Duties

Corporate managers are agents whose function is to maximize

the value of the firm. Because they are agents, there inevitably will
be some divergence of interest between their interests and investors'
presumptive goal of wealth maximization. Competitive labor, product and capital markets, as well as the market for corporate control,
act to limit this divergence of interest. But because these markets do
not operate costlessly -

they all require costly monitoring -

they

16

limit, but do not eliminate, agency costs. Explicit contracts governing the employment relationship may also reduce agency costs.
Again, however, such contracts are costly to negotiate and enforce,
and thus agency costs are likely to remain positive. Similarly, direct
15.

445 U.S. 222 (1980).

16. For a general discussion of agency costs in the corporate context, see Jensen &
Mackling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs & OwnershipStructure, 3
J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
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monitoring of managers' actions, either by shareholders themselves
or by professional monitors such as independent directors, is an additional, albeit imperfect, method of reducing agency costs.
Fiduciary duties imposed by law are yet another method of reducing agency costs. 17 Acting as implied contractual terms in agency
agreements, these provisions of law allow the parties to avoid the
costs of writing lengthy and detailed contracts, thereby reducing the
cost of contracting. The utility of fiduciary duties, however, like that
of all implied contractual terms, depends on whether the implied
terms remain consistent with the intent of the parties. The question,
in other words, is whether the terms implied by law would have resulted from bargaining if the costs of contracting were zero.
In the corporate context people create agency relationships to
increase the value of the firm. The imposition of fiduciary duties on
corporate managers will contribute to this objective if agency costs
are reduced, all other things being equal. But all other things are not
always equal. A rule of fiduciary duty that had the effect of preventing $100 of beneficial conduct for every $50 reduction in agency
costs, for example, would not be a desirable rule. Investors would not
contract for such a rule because they would be worse off as a result.
If the gains from certain conduct outweigh any increased agency
costs, in other words, it would be perverse to interpret fiduciary duties to prohibit the behavior because the beneficiaries of such duties,
the investors, would be the losers.
B.

Insider Trading and Fiduciary Duties

This analysis suggests that we should analyze the issue of
whether trading by corporate managers on inside information is consistent with their fiduciary duties by reference to the effect of such
trading on investors' wealth. If insider trading increases investors'
wealth, then investors would not contract to prohibit the practice and
would receive no benefit from a prohibition implied by law.
If corporate managers are allowed to trade on the basis of inside
information, shareholders' wealth might increase for two reasons.
First, managers might possess increased incentives to create valuable
information, and thereby increase the value of the firm, if they are
allowed to profit by trading. Second, insider trading may provide
firms with a valuable additional mechanism for communicating in17.

For a discussion of the function of fiduciary duties in the context of transfers of

control, see Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE U. 698 (1982).
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formation to the market."8
An inevitable problem in all principal-agent relationships is that
of designing a compensation scheme that minimizes divergence of
interest. If it were possible to observe the effort and output of individual managers costlessly, it would be possible to limit agency costs
by continual renegotiations of compensation packages. Those managers who work hard and perform well would be rewarded; those who
shirk and perform poorly would be penalized.
It is difficult, however, to monitor effort and output accurately.
Because managers commonly work in teams, it is difficult to isolate
the productivity and contribution of any one manager. The rational
manager will reason that other team members will share the benefits
of good performance and will bear some of the costs of bad performance. This recognition by individual managers, that they will neither
capture all of the benefits of superior performance nor bear all costs
of inferior performance, decreases their incentives to work hard.
Moreover, renegotiations themselves are costly, so firms have incentives to conserve on their use; unfortunately, reducing the number of
negotiations increases the managers' incentive to shirk and thus exacerbates the principal-agent problem.
The ability to trade on the basis of valuable information is one
partial solution to this principal-agent problem. Imagine the situation of a manager who thinks that he has a good idea that will increase the firm's value. If insider trading is prohibited, his incentive
to develop the idea and convince others to pursue it is the hope that
he, not other members of the team, will receive a reward at the time
of his next salary review. If insider trading is permitted, in contrast,
the manager can immediately "renegotiate" his compensation package by purchasing shares. Because the reward is more certain, the
manager's incentive to develop the valuable information and increase
the firm's value is greater if insider trading is permitted.19 Indeed,
insider trading is the only compensation scheme that allows immediate and costless renegotiation whenever managers believe that they
have the opportunity to develop valuable information.20
18. These two explanations of why insider trading might be beneficial are discussed
more fully in Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REv. 857
(1983).
19. Similarly, structuring compensation packages with insider trading might allow firms
to attract managers who will work hard and not be overly risk averse in their choice of investment projects. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 18, at 871-72.
20. On the economics of executive compensation schemes, see generally Smith & Watts,
Incentive and Tax Effect of Executive Compensation Plans, 7 AusTL J. 139 (1982).
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A second reason why investors may benefit from insider trading
is that it gives firms an additional method for communicating information. A firm, the lowest cost producer of information about itself,
has strong incentives to have its stock prices reflect information
about the firm. 2 ' The more informative the firm's stock price, for
example, the lower the incentive of investors to expend resources on
wasteful search in an attempt to identify mispriced securities. This
reduction in investors' search costs will increase the net returns on
investment and cause shares to trade at a higher price.
One method for the firm to provide information to the market is
simply to disclose it. There is a serious moral hazard associated with
disclosure, however, because low-quality firms can copy this disclosure strategy and thus investors may not pay any attention to disclosed information. 2 Alternatively, disclosure of the information
may cause it to lose its value, as would be the case, for example, if a
firm disclosed the details of a promising new technology to competitors. In situations in which disclosure is likely to be ineffective, insider trading gives firms an additional method of communicating information. Because other market participants can observe trading by
insiders, albeit imperfectly, prices will move in the direction that the
new information implies. Thus share prices will reflect more information in markets in which insider trading is permitted than in markets in which it is prohibited.
These two aspects of insider trading - the increased incentive
to produce valuable information and the additional mechanism for
communicating information - are powerful reasons why courts
should not interpret fiduciary duties to prohibit the practice. To be
sure, these are not the only effects of insider trading. Critics have
identified a wide array of potential perverse incentives that the use of
insider trading as a compensation scheme might create. They have
argued, for example, that the practice gives managers incentives to
reduce the value of the firm, to undertake risky projects, to delay
public disclosures, or to slow the transmission of information within
the firm. The criticisms, and the responses to them, have been exten21.

Firms do not have perfect incentives to disclose information about themselves. Dis-

closures by one firm, for example, are valuable to investors of other firms who do not bear the
costs of disclosure. Information thus might be underproduced. This is one rationale for a
mandatory disclosure system. See Easterbrook & Fisehel, MandatoryDisclosure and the Protection ofInvestors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984).
22. One efficiency justification for antifraud rules is that they reduce this moral hazard

problem. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 21.
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sively discussed elsewhere, 2 and no point would be served by summarizing this literature here. Two points, however, should be made.
First, there are equally plausible counter-arguments to many of
the arguments that the critics of insider trading offer. Thus the argument that insider trading is detrimental because it causes managers
to accept risky projects can be met with the reverse argument: insider trading may be an efficient compensation scheme because it
tends to reduce the agency costs associated with the investment poli24
cies of risk-averse corporate managers who are unable to diversify.
The risk aversion of corporate managers might also explain why
shareholders' welfare increases if insiders may profit on bad news as
well as good. If insiders can benefit from investment decisions that
are optimal ex ante, even if they turn out poorly ex post, then their
incentive to make investment decisions for the purpose of increasing
the value of the firm, aA opposed to avoiding bad outcomes, is increased. Similarly, insider trading might accelerate disclosure because managers will only be able to profit if stock prices adjust to
new information. When direct disclosure is impossible, insider trading might lead to information being impounded in price where it otherwise would not. And insider trading also might increase the flow of
information within the firm if higher managers can profit by receiving valuable information before it becomes publicly available.
Second, suppose the critics are correct, and insider trading does
create some perverse incentives. What conclusion follows? Certainly
it does not follow that insider trading is harmful to investors. The
existence of costs does not prove the nonexistence of benefits or that
these costs outweigh any benefits. The question, of course, is ultimately an empirical one, for which there is no obvious answer. The
actions of firms and the development of common law rules, however,
do shed some light on whether trading by insiders decreases shareholders' welfare.
Firms and managers have strong incentives to allocate the property right in valuable information to its highest valued user. This is a
simple application of the Coase theorem.2 5 If insider trading is an
inefficient compensation scheme that results in a reduction in the
value of the firm, then both managers and the firm (investors) will
23. The most comprehensive discussions are found in Manne, Law Professors, supra
note 14, and Carlton & Fischel, supra note 18.
24. On the more general problem of risk aversion of agents, see Scharell, Risk Sharing
and Incentives in the Principaland Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55 (1979).
25. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960).
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gain by prohibiting it. Conversely, if insider trading is an efficient
compensation scheme because it gives managers an incentive to increase the value of the firm and/or provides firms with an additional
method for communicating valuable information, then both managers and the firm (investors) will gain by allowing it. The actions of
firms thus provide valuable clues regarding the effect of insider trading on investors' welfare.
While the issue has never been researched rigorously, it appears
that firms have not tried to prohibit trading by insiders.2 6 Firms have
not announced prohibitions of insider trading in their c6rporate charters. Both before and after federal regulation of insider trading, insiders have traded in shares and earned positive abnormal returns.27
In short, firms do not seem to share the perception of many academics and regulators that insider trading creates grave perils for investors. If anything, the behavior of firms suggests that insider trading
may be beneficial.
Like firms, states also have incentives to adopt efficient rules of
corporate law to attract incorporations. 28 State and common law
rules that have survived over time, therefore, are entitled to at least
a weak presumption of efficiency. The common law rule, at least
with respect to trading on organized exchanges, is that insider trading is permitted. 29 This common law rule tends to support the proposition that insider trading is beneficial.
That insider trading may be beneficial in some situations, however, does not mean that it always will be so. If an insider's use of
information reduces the value of the information to the firm - such
as where an insider purchases shares and causes the price to rise
with the knowledge that the firm is about to purchase the same
shares - then the trading may constitute a usurpation of a corporate opportunity. 30 Purchase of the shares in this situation is no different from purchasing land with the knowledge that the firm intends to make the same acquisition. In addition, the incentive effect
that allowing insider trading may create might be absent in some
26. See H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET, supra note 14.
27. Several studies are collected in Carlton & Fischel, supra note 18, at 303 n.12.
28. See R. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION (1978) for an elaboration of
the role of the competition among states in corporate law.
29.

See, e.g., Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933). See also H.
supra note 14, at 1-15.
30. Cf. Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949) (purchase of
shares by corporate insider with knowledge that corporation was about to purchase the same
shares held to be breach of fiduciary duty).
MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET,
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situations. Trading by those who do not develop valuable information
may be inefficient, and thus the firm might want to prohibit such
persons as government officials, lawyers, accountants, and printers
who are informed of an impending merger from trading on the information. But while the firm might want to prohibit these persons
from trading, that does not mean that it also wants to prohibit the
managers or employees who developed the idea of a merger or identified potential partners. The firm, in other words, might want to
prohibit some individuals, but not others, from trading on the same
information.
Properly understood, therefore, the relationship between insider
trading and fiduciary duties depends on whether the trading is consensual. In cases of nonconsensual trading, we should interpret fiduciary duties - standard-form terms governing agency relationships
to prohibit the practice. But not all trading on valuable information falls within this category. Firms have allowed insiders to own
and trade shares, both before and after the existence of regulations,
even where insiders systematically earn positive abnormal returns. In
these cases of consensual trading the firm has allocated the property
right in valuable information to corporate managers, and courts
should no more interpret fiduciary duties to prohibit insider trading
than to prohibit salary or other aspects of managers' compensation.
Courts, however, have largely ignored this crucial issue of
whether trading by an insider is consensual.3 1 Under current law,
insiders who trade and are sued by shareholders cannot raise as a
defense the fact that a disinterested majority of directors approved
the trading or that its possibility was negotiated explicitly as part of
a compensation package.32 Conversely, trading on information stolen
from the firm may not constitute insider trading in many situations.3 3 These results are precisely the opposite of what economic
theory would predict.
31. While the Supreme Court has not explicitly enunciated a test for insider trading
based on consent, some commentators argue that courts have, in effect, used such an analysis.
See, e.g., Macey, From Fairnessto Contract:The New Direction of the Rules Against Insider
Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9 (1984). To the extent this view is correct, the "prohibition"

against insider trading may be a special case of laws against theft and therefore beneficial.
32. See SEC v. Pearson, 426 F.2d 1339 (10th Cir. 1970); SEC v. Kalvex, Inc., 425 F.
Supp, 310, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).

33. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (theft of information by printer
who then traded with knowledge of future tender offer not illegal insider trading).
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C. The Supreme Court's Interpretationof Fiduciary Duties
Having established the relationship between fiduciary duties and
insider trading, we may now usefully focus more closely on the Supreme Court's analysis of the issue. Relying on the Security and Exchange Commission's famous decision in In re Cady, Roberts &
Co.,34 the Court stated that the fiduciary duty of insiders not to
trade on valuable information rests on two elements: (1) "'the existence of a relationship affording access to inside information intended

. . .

for a corporate purpose'" and not for the personal bene-

fit of anyone else; and (2) the inherent "'unfairness of allowing a
corporate insider to take advantage of valuable information by trading without disclosure.' ,5 Neither element provides a coherent rationale for interpreting the fiduciary duty of corporate managers to
prohibit insider trading.
The first justification - that insiders should not trade on the
basis of valuable information that is intended solely for a corporate
purpose - is tautological. If the property right in valuable information is allocated to the firm, then insiders should not be allowed to
trade. It does not follow, however, that insiders should not be allowed to trade if the property right in invaluable information is not
allocated to the firm. In the situation of consensual trading, nothing
in managers' fiduciary duties should prevent them from trading.
The second justification - that there is an inherent unfairness
in allowing managers to profit by virtue of their exclusive access to
valuable information - assumes that "fairness" requires that managers and investors be treated alike. But there are obvious differences between managers and investors which warrant different treatment. Is it "inherently unfair," for example, for managers but not
shareholders to receive a salary? Presumably it is not, because shareholders realize that if managers receive a salary, the value of the
firm will be greater than if managers do not receive a salary. And
the larger the size of the pie, the more shareholders, as well as managers, will benefit. Insider trading is not "inherently unfair" for precisely the same reason. If insider trading is part of a manager's compensation package because of its beneficial incentive and information
effects, then both shareholders and managers benefit from allowing
it. What the Court has failed to understand is that insider trading
34. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
35. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653-54 (1983) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222, 227 (1980)).
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need not come at the expense of investors any more than do other
kinds of compensation. Because both shareholders and managers
benefit from compensation schemes that increase the value of the
firm, no fairness argument exists for prohibiting insider trading. On
the contrary, it would be "inherently unfair" to deny shareholders
the ability to enter into contracts with their agents that result in an
increase in shareholders' wealth.
D. Did the Insiders of Equity Funding Violate Their Fiduciary
Duties?
The Supreme Court in Dirks concluded that the insiders of Equity Funding did not breach their fiduciary duty by providing Dirks
with information about the fraud. The Court reasoned that they "received no monetary or personal benefit for revealing Equity Funding's secrets, nor was their purpose to make a gift of valuable information to Dirks." 36 Rather, "the tippers were motivated by a desire
to expose the fraud. ' 37 Because the insiders did not act with an improper purpose in giving the information to Dirks, Dirks did not act
unlawfully in persuading his clients to sell.
The difficulty with the Court's analysis is that it ignores the effects of tipping on the wealth of the firm's investors. I have emphasized that we should view fiduciary duties as standard-form contractual terms that govern agency relationships. Whether a corporate
manager's conduct is a breach of fiduciary duty, therefore, depends
on whether the conduct promotes or frustrates investors' presumptive
goal of increasing the value of the firm.
Instead of analyzing the actions of Equity Funding's insiders
under this standard, the Court emphasized the insiders' role in exposing the fraud. But exposure of fraud is a public good; consumers
and society as a whole benefit, but the firm's investors do not. And it
is the effect of conduct on investors' wealth that should determine
whether a breach of fiduciary duty has occurred. Under this test, it
could be argued that the actions by Equity Funding's insiders were
causally related to the company's eventual bankruptcy, to the obvious detriment of its current investors. While the news would have
been discovered at some point, some of the firm's current investors
would have sold at inflated prices to new investors. The disclosures
caused current investors to lose the ability to sell at higher prices.
36. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667.
37. Id.
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It is possible, in other words, to turn the Court's analysis on its
head. There is little question that if Dirks had involved an insider's
tip to analysts that the firm was about to announce record earnings,
which resulted in purchase of shares by clients in advance of the
announcement, the Court would have held that the insider breached
his fiduciary duty and the analyst was a "participant after the
fact."' 38 Disclosure of a fraud, however, is perfectly legal. Thus disclosures that increase the value of the firm to the benefit of investors
are illegal, while disclosures that cause the firm to go bankrupt are
perfectly lawful. Because the Court equated the social benefit from
exposing frauds with fiduciary duties, it failed to appreciate this
tension.
A fundamental distinction exists, however, between the effect of
rules ex ante and ex post. At the time the firm is organized, shares
will sell for a higher price if the firm's ability to defraud investors is
reduced. The lower the probability of fraud, the fewer the resources
that investors must spend on monitoring, and the lower the discount
that investors will apply in valuing the shares.39 This relationship
holds true even if the fraud will be perpetrated on future classes of
investors. Because current investors realize they may be selling their
shares at a lower price to subsequent investors who fear the market
price is artificially inflated because of fraud, they will pay more for
shares under a rule that restricts the firm's ability to defraud future
investors. Thus the actions of Equity Funding's insiders were probably consistent with the organizing principles of the firm, and therefore with their fiduciary duties, even if, ex post, the firm's investors
would have preferred no disclosure.
An important implication of the preceding discussion is that the
personal benefit test the Court used to determine whether a disclosing insider breaches a fiduciary duty is completely irrelevant. Assume, for example, that the insiders who provided Dirks with information received some kind of' benefit, perhaps in the form of direct
or indirect compensation, and that they did not act solely out of a
desire to expose the fraud. (I am assuming that we can define "benefit." After all, utility from exposing fraud is itself a kind of benefit.)
Should the existence of compensation make a difference?
Clearly it should not. The relevant inquiry in analyzing the propriety of disclosure of information to analysts, like the inquiry with
38. See id.
39. This is the economic rationale of the antifraud laws. See supra note 21.
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respect to trading itself, is whether the action is consistent with the
explicit and implicit contractual terms that govern the firm. Since
the actions of Equity Funding's insiders were probably consistent
with the terms that would maximize the value of the firm ex ante, no
violation of fiduciary duty occurred. Other kinds of disclosures to
analysts, as I discuss in the next section, might also be consistent
with fiduciary duties, properly understood. Of course the opposite situation can also occur. Imagine a situation where a corporate insider
stands on a street corner and randomly gives away valuable corporate information to strangers who trade on it. Such conduct is clearly
inconsistent with fiduciary duties even if there is no obvious personal
benefit. The existence or non-existence of personal benefit sheds no
light whatsoever on the propriety of tipping information.
II.

THE ROLE OF INVESTMENT ANALYSTS AS INFORMATIONAL
INTERMEDIARIES

Spectacular frauds are rare events, and thus Dirks is an aber-

ration. Far more common are situations in which analysts try to provide their clients with valuable but less dramatic information. The
implications of the Dirks case for the application of insider trading
laws to analysts in these more routine situations will depend on future judicial interpretation. It is plausible to assume, however, that
insider trading prohibitions will continue to be applied to analysts.
Indeed, the Court said as much when it emphasized that the analyst's receipt and use of information from an insider who receives a
direct or indirect "personal benefit" constitutes a violation of law by
both the insider and the analyst.40 But examination of the role of the
investment analyst demonstrates that there is little logic in subjecting them to insider trading laws.
A.

The Sale of Securities in the Presence of Asymmetric
Information

The sale of securities, either by the firm to investors or by current to future investors, can be viewed as an example of the familiar
problem faced by competing sellers of goods of varying quality in the
presence of asymmetric information. Unless some method exists for
investors to distinguish high quality from low quality securities, they
will tend to view all securities as average in quality. High quality
securities will sell at prices lower than they would if information
40. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662-63.
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about their quality could be transmitted costlessly; the opposite
would be true for low quality securities. This process will result in a
"lemons" market, in which low quality securities dominate because
firms lack the incentive to offer high quality securities. 4'
One method for firms offering high quality securities to distinguish themselves is to disclose the information supporting their belief. But, as discussed earlier, there is a serious moral hazard problem associated with the disclosure of information because firms
offering low quality securities can mimic high quality firms by disclosing the same information. In this manner firms offering low quality securities can erode the informational content of disclosure, causing investors once again to value all securities as average.
Moreover, disclosure may not always be possible. The clearest
case occurs if disclosure of information would cause it to lose its
value. A firm that wants to sell securities at a high price because of
an anticipated technological breakthrough, for example, must have
some method for convincing investors to pay a price for the securities
without directly disclosing the information about the breakthrough.
In the absence of such a method investors will view the securities as
average, and will calculate the price they are willing to pay
accordingly.
Firms have developed a wide array of tools for overcoming this
problem of asymmetric information. Dividend policy, capital structure, and the percentage of shares owned by insiders are all mechanisms through which high quality firms can attempt to distinguish
themselves from low quality firms. Sale of securities through investment bankers and reliance on independent accountants to verify financial statements are other methods for achieving this same objective.42 Allowing insiders to trade also enables the firm to
communicate information to investors indirectly, and insider trading
may also make direct disclosures more credible. An announcement
that increased earnings are expected is likely to be more credible if
coupled with a disclosure that insiders have increased their stake in
the firm.
Dissemination of information to investment analysts is yet another method for reducing the problem of asymmetric information.
This kind of selective dissemination has several advantages over pub41. See Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons". Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcON. 488 (1970).

42.

These mechanisms for disseminating information are discussed in more detail in

Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 17.
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lic disclosure. First, it may be cheaper than public disclosure because
there are likely to be economies of scale in interpreting and verifying
information. Second, the moral hazard problem is reduced. Unlike
many firms that may resort to capital markets infrequently, investment analysts are repeat players who have a strong interest in maintaining a reputation for honesty. Because investors realize that analysts have this reputational interest, they will give analysts'
recommendations more weight than disclosures by the firm alone. In
addition, selective disclosure to analysts may also allow firms to communicate valuable information that they could not disclose publicly.
Recall the firm that anticipates a technological breakthrough and
thus want to sell its securities at a high price without disclosing the
details to competitors. By selective disclosure to analysts who then
recommend purchase to their clients, the firm can communicate the
essence of the information without giving away valuable information
to competitors. Finally, selective disclosure to analysts enables firms
to communicate information about quality with less risk of suit than
if the information were publicly disclosed.
Selective disclosure to analysts is not a perfect solution to the
problem of asymmetric information. Analysts may disclose the underlying information to investors, for example, or sell it to competitors. For these reasons, firms may refuse to disclose some information to analysts or limit their disclosures to analysts with strong
reputational credentials. In spite of these constraints, it is plausible
to assume that the use of analysts will facilitate the transmission of
information.
Analysts serve a monitoring function as well as providing a conduit for the transmission of information. Because managers may disseminate false information about the firm, or may attempt to conceal
negative information, analysts have incentives to engage in some
search themselves before making recommendations to their clients.
This monitoring activity is a natural complement to the role of analysts in communicating information about the firm to investors.
The use of analysts benefits firms and investors alike. They enable firms to communicate information more cheaply than if all information had to be publicly disclosed, and because analysts have a
comparative advantage over investors in interpreting, verifying and
seeking out information, investors will engage in less wasteful search
if they can rely on analysts' recommendations.
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B.

Why Investors Hire Analysts

One question that has long puzzled financial economists is
whether the information possessed by analysts and other professional
investors can produce superior risk-adjusted portfolio returns, after
transaction costs, compared to those available from a simple buy and
hold strategy. The early efficient markets literature answered this
question in the negative. 43 This early literature claimed that capital
markets are so efficient, precisely because of the efforts of professional investors to identify mispriced securities, that these same professional investors could not systematically possess information that
stock prices did not fully reflect. This claim, however, led to a disturbing paradox. If market professionals cannot earn superior portfolio returns, they lack any incentive to expend resources to discover
mispriced securities. And if investors do no better following analysts'
recommendations than they do with a buy and hold strategy, then
why are they willing to pay for advice that is, by hypothesis, worthless? The early efficient markets literature, in sum, placed great
weight on the role of market professionals in explaining market efficiency, but offered no explanation for why these professionals or
their clients are willing to engage in this effort."'
More recefit developments in the efficient markets literature
have addressed this seeming paradox. In an important series of articles Sanford Grossman has argued that markets cannot be "efficient" in the sense that prices fully reflect all information. 45 Rather,
some information must not be reflected in stock prices to ensure that
informed traders earn a competitive return for search, in terms of
trading profits, from possession of superior information. Under the
Grossman model, in other words, the efficiency paradox disappears:
analysts are willing to engage in search, and investors are willing to
pay for their recommendations.
Whether professional investors can earn superior returns, as the
Grossman model predicts, or not, as the early efficient markets liter43. See, e.g., Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970); Jensen, Risk, The Pricingof Capital Assets, and the Evaluation
of Investment Portfolios, 42 J. Bus. 167 (1969).
44. One possible explanation for why market participants might pay for information

even though their portfolio returns are not increased is that search has an important consumption element. Under this theory, hiring an analyst is analogous to going to Las Vegas: expected
wealth is not increased, but utility is increased through consumption.
45. See, e.g., Grossman, On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets Where Trades
Have Diverse Information, 31 J. FIN. 73 (1976); Grossman & Stiglitz, Information and Competitive Price Systems, 66 AM. EcON. REV. 246 (1976).
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ature predicts, is, of course, an empirical question. While no definitive answer currently exists, recent empirical findings, often without
saying so explicitly, tend to support the Grossman model. 46 Under
this view the explanation for hiring analysts is simple - to obtain
superior information and earn abnormal positive returns.
C. The Effect of Applying Insider Trading Laws to Analysts
The obvious effect of applying insider trading laws to investment analysts is to raise the cost to both firms and investors of using
analysts to communicate valuable information. This result has important implications for the actions of firms, analysts and investors.
If legal rules place a "tax" on the use of analysts, then firms will use
other method of communicating information. It is difficult to know
precisely what method they will use. They may increase the amount
of public disclosure. Alternatively, they may increase the amount of
debt in their capital structure or increase the percentage of shares
owned by insiders.
The difficulty with forcing firms to use other methods of communicating information is that those methods may be more costly.
That firms voluntarily transmit information to analysts suggests that
the use of analysts is an efficient method of communicating information. Increasing public disclosure, by contrast, may subject the firm
to possible legal liability and cause public investors to incur needless
interpretation and verification costs. Similarly, increasing the
amount of debt in the firm's capital structure may help to distinguish
high quality firms but also increase potential bankruptcy costs; enlarging the percentage of shares owned by insiders also may communicate information about quality but at the cost of requiring insiders
to bear more risk, for which they must be compensated. Making it
more difficult for firms to use one mechanism of transmitting information will cause them to rely on higher cost substitutes.
From the perspective of analysts, the conclusion is similar. Analysts, according to current legal rules, may search for information
themselves and analyze publicly available information, but they may
not receive "inside" information unless they publicly disclose it. Public disclosure, of course, is not a realistic possibility, because it will
46. See, e.g., Bjerring, Lakonishok & Vermaelen, Stock Prices and FinancialAnalysts'
Recommendations, 38 J. FIN. 187 (1983); Givaly & Lakonishok, The Information Content of
Financial Analysts' Forecasts: Some Evidence on Semi-Strong Inefficiency, I J. AcCT. &
EcoN. 165 (1979) (both concluding that abnormal returns are possible by following analysts'
recommendations).
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cause the information to lose its value. Nobody will pay an analyst
for information that he must publicly disclose before selling it to his
clients. Firms might not communicate information to analysts, moreover, if analysts must disclose it, since the desire to avoid disclosure
might be the firm's reason for using an intermediary.
In practical terms, then, legal rules try to deny analysts access
to the most efficient source of information: the firm itselL It is irrelevant whether the firm wants the analyst to have the information.
Legal rules require the analyst to engage in costly search in an attempt to duplicate the information that the firm would have provided
voluntarily. Just as insider trading laws have the effect of forcing
firms to utilize more costly methods of communicating information,
they also have the effect of forcing analysts to use more costly methods of acquiring information.
This effect of making the process of transmitting information
more costly operates to the detriment of investors, the supposed beneficiaries of insider trading laws. Application of such laws does not
eliminate the problem of asymmetric information; rather, the effect
is to make it more difficult (costly) to reduce the informational disparity. Investors will have to pay more to obtain the same information. Alternatively, they may engage in wasteful search themselves,
to distinguish between high and low quality firms. These are real
cash outflows that will decrease the net return on investment.
The magnitude of this effect is difficult to predict. It depends on
such variables as the efficiency of insider trading laws in deterring
the transmission of information and how close other methods of communicating information are as substitutes for use of analysts. It may
be, for example, that because of the materiality requirement, legal
rules have only a minimal deterrent effect.47 Similarly, the increased
costs that the use of other methods of communicating information
impose may be trivial. The relevant conclusion, however, is that any
increased costs that investors incur in obtaining information about
firms makes them worse off.
D.

Fairness

The proponents of insider trading laws might concede everything up to this point and argue that it is all irrelevant. After all, the
47. The materiality requirement prohibits trading based on "important" information
such as knowledge of an impending merger. It does not prohibit trading whenever there is

asymmetric information. Nor does it prohibit a decision not to trade based on asymmetric
information, no matter how "material."
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discussions concerning the legal prohibition against insider trading
have never focused on efficient methods of compensating corporate
managers or of communicating information to investors. Rather, the
focus has been on considerations of fairness, particularly the perceived unfairness of one group of investors having access to valuable
information in advance of others.
At least in the context of investment analysts, however, this is a
very strange notion of fairness. We can view the hiring of an analyst
as the purchase of superior product-information. Other market participants may decline to purchase superior information and simply
accept the market price as given. They earn lower returns, but they
also save the costs of becoming informed. Neither group of participants is better off than the other."8
By what theory of fairness are these two classes of investors, one
that has paid for superior information and one that has not, entitled
to equal treatment? A more intuitively compelling theory of fairness
would treat these two classes of investors differently rather than allowing those who are free riders to obtain the same benefit from information as those who pay for it. If using analysts is an efficient
method for the firm to communicate information, then no plausible
theory of fairness prohibits their use.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in Dirks v. SEC, recognizing that
analysts like Raymond Dirks cannot function if they must publicly
disclose valuable information, represents a small step forward. Unfortunately, the Court did not appreciate the full implications of this
principle. The decision suggests that absent a motivation to expose
corporate fraud, analysts who convey valuable information to their
clients act illegally. Such a legal rule reflects a lack of understanding
of the beneficial role of investment analysts as informational
intermediaries.

48.

For a fuller discussion of these two classes of investors, and the implications for

securities regulation, see Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases
Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. L. 1 (1982).
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